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Tort Liability for Negligence in Missouri
I.

The Duty to Use Care

In order to make out a prima facie case in Missouri in
an action based upon a negligent tort of the defendant, the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant was negligent
and that his negligent act was at least a part of the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's damage. In order to show that the
defendant was negligent the plaintiff must show that there
was a legal duty to use care resting upon the defendant and
owed to the plaintiff, and that such duty was not fulfilled.
The defendant may defeat this prima facie case by showing
that the plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was a
part of the proximate cause of his damage. The present
article will deal merely with the question of the defendant's
negligence-under what circumstances the duty to use care
arises; the subjects of proximate cause and contributory
negligence will be covered in a subsequent article.
STANDARD OF CARE

Assuming that there is a duty to use care, the question
arises as to how much care the law requires. The law on this
point as to sane adults is well settled everywhere, that the
standard is that amount and kind of care which the average
or ordinary prudent man would use under similar circumstances.1 The standard is thus an artificial, external, objective
one; this is justified on the ground that since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can insist that his own standard of care
be adopted, the best way to deal with the matter is to ignore
the subjective capacity of each person and set up an ideal
1. Keown v. St. Louis R. R. Co. (1897) 141 Mo. 86; Swanson v.
City of Sedalia (1901) 89 Mo. App. 121; Force v. Kansas City (1904) 181
Mo. 137.
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standard.' There is an advantage in the objective over the
subjective standard in that it entitles one to assume, in the
absence of reasonable notice to the contrary, that the person
with whom he deals or is thrown in contact will exercise this
objective standard or be responsible for the consequences. 3
As to the standard required of children, there are almost
no cases raising the question where the child is the defendant,'
so that we are left to draw inferences from the cases where the
child is plaintiff and the defense of contributory negligence is
set up: in those cases it is not clear whether the test is subjective
or objective; some of the decisions seem to say that the capacity
and experience, as well as the age, of the individual child is to
be taken into consideration.5 On the other hand, the decision
in Holmes v. Mo. Pac. Railway6 takes the view that the child
is to exercise that degree of care which a prudent child of his
age would exercise under similar circumstances. In O'Flaherty
v. Union Ry. Co.,' the court in refusing to apply the adult rule
to a child said that all that was necessary was that the plaintiff
should have exercised care and prudence equal to his capacity.'
This, of course, does not mean that children are bound to use
care equal to their capacity. 9 In its opinion, the court included
2. That the standard is not subjective, see Charless v. Rankin (1867)
22 Mo. 566; Teepen v. Taylor (1910) 141 Mo. App. 282 (honest belief and
advice of others is not the proper criterion).
3. That the standard is not the custom of others engaged in the same
business, see Koons v. St. L. & I. M. R. R. (1877) 65 Mo. 592. See Kelley
v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co. (1881) 75 Mo. 138, 144, where the court said "the
plaintiff has no right to presume that the servants in charge of the locomotive will obey the requirements of the law." Whether there was notice
to the plaintiff that they probably would not do so, does not appear.
4. In Conway v. Reed (1877) 66 Mo. 346, the defendant was a child
charged with negligence, but the question as to the standard of care was
not raised.
5. McCarthy v. Cass Avenue & Fair Ground Ry. Co. (1887) 92 Mo.
536 ("capacity, age, knowledge and experience").
6. (1907) 207 Mo. 149.
7. (1869) 45 Mo. 70.
8. Boland v. Missouri Railroad Co. (1865) 36 Mo. 484; Heinzle v.
Metropolitan Street Railway Co. (1904) 182 Mo. 528, accord.
9. In Stern v. City of St. Louis (1900) 161 Mo. 146, the lower court's
charge, "such reasonable care and caution as a boy of his age, experience
and intelligence is individually capable of," was held erroneous as requiring the highest degree of care of which the child was capable, which
is or may be greater than the care required of an adult. For the purpose
of determining the standard of care the age at which one becomes an
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in its statement not only children, but idiots and insane persons;
but there seems to be no decision in Missouri in regard to the
care to be used by such classes of persons.
In O'Flaherty v. Union Ry. Co.,' 0 the question as to the
care to be used by infirm persons was discussed briefly. The
rule as to them seems to be that the infirmity is to be taken
into consideration as one of the circumstances. The result
of this is twofold: a person with an infirmity must generally
use greater care because of his infirmity; but if he finds himself
without negligence in a position of peril, he cannot be held
chargeable with failure to use that amount and kind of care
which a person could use without such infirmity. For example,
a blind man who is about to cross a street must use greater
care than one who can see; but if he does use the proper amount
of care, and unexpectedly is placed in peril, he is not required
to use the same amount and kind of care which a prudent
person with normal eyesight would use. Tho nearly all
the decisions are in cases where the infirm person was the
plaintiff, it would seem that the same reasoning ought to
apply to cases where he is sued as a defendant.
DEGREES OF CARE-DEGREES OF. NEGLIGENCE

The law of bailments generally classifies the degrees of
care to be used by the bailee as follows: if the bailment is for
the benefit of both bailee and bailor, as in the case where a
chattel is let out for hire, the bailee is bound to use ordinary
care;" if the bailment is for the benefit of the bailor alone, as
adult is apparently less than 21 years. In Coleman v. HimmelbergerHarrisonLand & Lumber Co. (1904) 105 Mo. App. 254, 272, the court said,
"there is no arbitrary rule fixing the age when a youth may be declared
wholly capable of understanding and avoiding danger. Yet it seems to
us a youth 18 years of age, of ordinary intelligence and experience,
should show some incapacity in addition to his minority to warrant the
court in directing as a matter of law, that he was not required to use the
same care as an adult." In Berry v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. (1908) 214
Mo. 593, it was held that as a matter of law a child of four years is incapable of exercising care. This is a fictitious way of saying that even
if a child of four is capable of exercising care, such fact has no legal significance.
10. (1869) 45 Mo. 70.
11. Levi & Co. v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1911) 157 Mo. App. 536,
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in the case of a gratuitous deposit for safe-keeping, the bailee
is bound only to use slight care; 12 while if the bdilment is for
the benefit of the bailee alone, as in the case of a gratuitous
loan for use, the bailee is bound to use extraordinary care. 13
This classification and nomenclature were imported from the
civil law into the common law of bailments, and attempts have
been made to use the distinctions in our law of torts, but without
success. As has been seen, the standard in torts is that of the
average prudent man under similar circumstances, the degrees
of care in fact being infinite, but there being only one degree of
care in law.
The term gross negligence is used in the law of bailments
to indicate that the bailee without benefit has not used even
the slight care which is required of him; i.e., it is said that he is
liable only for gross negligence. The term gross negligence
is thus used merely to indicate the degree of care which the law
of bailments requires. As used in the common law of torts
the term gross negligence means that the defendant has fallen
far short of the amount and kind of care required by law; but
since his liability is the same whether his default is small or
great, the term becomes a mere matter of description and not
of definition; or, as has been frequently said,14 the term gross as
applied to negligence is only a vituperative epithet. In statutes,
however, where the term gross negligence is used, it is generally
12.

In Eddy v. Livingston (1865) 35 Mo. 487, 494, the defendant had

received money upon a gratuitous undertaking to transmit it to the owner;

the charge of the court below practically held him liable at his peril for
the loss. In holding this erroneous the court apparently affirmed the
doctrine that a gratuitous bailee is liable only for gross negligence or bad

faith. See also King v. Exchange Bank (1904) 106 Mo. App. 1. But in
Stanard Milling Co. v. White Line Central Transit Co. (1894) 122 Mo. 258,
275, it is said that the test of gross negligence is whether the gratuitous
bailee used ordinary care, and in Levi & Co. v. ?/. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1911)
157 Mo. App. 536, 543, the court said that the question whether the bailment was for hire or gratuitous, was not important. These cases in
bailments seem to have been influenced by the rule in the law of torts that
there is no difference in legal effect between negligence and gross negligence. The effect of these decisions is to leave the law of Missouri on
the subject of the care to be exercised by a gratuitous bailee somewhat in

doubt.
13.
14.

There seems to be no Missouri case on this point.

See, for example, McPheeters v. 1-. & St. J. R. R. (1869) 45 Mo.
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held to indicate a serious and not merely a slight failure to
exercise the amount and kind of care required by the common
law. 5
TO WHOM THE DUTY MUST BE OWED

If A intentionally and without excuse strikes at B and hits
C, it has been held that C may recover against A for the battery,
though there was no intent or negligence as to C. C is thus
allowed to take advantage of the unlawful intent to strike B. 16
Suppose, however, that A was acting negligently as to B and
without negligence or intent strikes C; may C recover here?
If the duty to use care must always be owed to the plaintiff
it is obvious that C cannot recover. Where the injury to the
plaintiff has been caused by the defendant's bringing active force
to bear against him,' 7 the question has rarely arisen except in
15.

Dolphin v. Worcester etc. R. R. (1905) 189 Mass. 270.

seems to be no Missouri statute using the phrase.

There

16. James v. Campbell (1832) 5 Carrington & Payne 372. The rule
in criminal law is similar. The Queen v. Saunders (1573) 2 Plowden 473.
This is only one of several important differences between the liability of
a negligent and that of a wilful tort-feasor. The other differences are:
first, contributory negligence is no defense to a wilful tort; second, special
damage must usually be shown where negligence is relied on, while in
case of most intentional torts, special damage is not an ingredient in the
cause of action; third, punitive damages may be given in some classes of
intentional torts, but not where the defendant has acted merely negligently. Tho the liability of the negligent tort-feasor is much more
limited than that of the wilful wrongdoer, the boundary line between intent and negligence is one of degree and not of kind. The difference
between intent and negligence is briefly as follows: an intentional or wilful
tort-feasor is one who desires consequences which the law regards as
tortious or wrongful; the negligent tort-feasor is one who does not desire
tortious consequences, but who, if he had been of average prudence, would
have foreseen that tortious consequences would likely follow.
Thus
the gist of the first is desire-an affirmative state of mind; while the gist
of the other is usually inadvertence-a negative state of mind. There are
of course several degrees in fact between these two typical cases, and the
courts and text-writers are not agreed as to the exact place where the line
should be drawn. Where, however, there is a conscious neglect of duty
and the chances of injury are very great, it would seem that the defendant
should be treated as an intentional wrongdoer, tho he does not actually
desire the consequences; on the other hand, the mere fact that the defendant is conscious in his neglect of duty ought not to make him liable as if
he were wilful. Where the plaintiff has alleged a negligent tort in his
petition, he cannot recover for a wilful tort. O'Brien v. Loomis (1890)
43 Mo. App. 29.
17. The doctrine is frequently applied where the plaintiff relies upon
a positive duty, such as a duty of a land occupier to keep his premises in

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN

the following kind of cases. Suppose a child is on a railroad
track and a train is about to run over it due to the negligence
of the servants of the railroad; a bystander at quite a distance
from the track sees the peril of the child and attempts to save
it; he succeeds but in doing so is himself injured. There is no
difficulty about causation because the injury is direct and
immediate; nor is there any difficulty about contributory
negligence or assumption of risk because it is a proper assumption of risk to save human life; but if the bystander was very
far away from the track at the moment he saw the peril, in
what way is there negligence as to him? The answer to this
is that it is so probable that some one will attempt to save a
person thus imperiled that there is a duty not only towards
the person in danger but also towards one who seeks to extricate
him from the danger.' 8 Where property is in peril of negligent
injury there would seem to be likewise a duty towards one who
repair; in such a case it is well settled that the plaintiff must show that
he is the person to whom the duty is owed-for example, that he is a person
invited on business; even tho the defendant has allowed his premises to
get out of repair so that a business visitor might have recovered if injured,
this will not enable a plaintiff to recover if he is, for example, a trespasser
upon the plaintiff's property. Shaw v. Goldman (1905) 116 Mo. App. 332,
and cases cited on page 333.
There are cases where the plaintiff has recovered or the court has
assumed that he had the right to recover, tho from the facts it is difficult
to see that there was any negligence towards the plaintiff tho there was
negligence towards others. In Hoag v. Lake Shore R. R. Co. (1877) 85
Pa. 293, the defendant's railroad passed thru the plaintiff's land at the
base of a high wall along a creek; during a rainstorm there was a slide
of earth and rock from the hillside down to and upon the railroad track.
One of the defendant's engines, drawing a train of cars loaded with crude
oil, ran into the slide and was thrown off the track; two or three of the oil
cars burst, the oil caught fire, was carried down the creek for several
hundred feet and set fire to the plaintiff's property. It seemed clear that
no damage to the plaintiff could have been foreseen and whatever negligence there was, was a breach of duty to the owner of the oil. The only
question raised, however, was that of proximate cause, the defendant's
counsel perhaps assuming that negligence to the owner of the oil was
sufficient; and on the point of proximate cause the plaintiff lost the case.
Since the court followed the natural and probable consequence rule of
proximate cause, it would apparently make no difference in the decision
whether the defendant attacks the plaintiff's case by denying negligence or
causation, because in cases of setting or keeping forces in motion both
negligence and causation are determined by the same test of probability
of damage. Where a positive duty is relied upon, such as the duty to
repair, the probability of damage is not the sole test.
18. Donahoe v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. R. R. Co. (1884) 83 Mo. 560;
Williams v. U. S. Inc. Lamp Co. (1913) 173 Mo. App. 87.
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reasonably endeavors to rescue the property. On this point,
however, there is conflict of authority, some cases holding that
the value of property being much less than that of human life,
a person is not warranted in risking his own life to save it from
destruction."9
WHEN THE DUTY ARISES

Thus far we have been assuming a duty to use care; the
most important question to be discussed is as to when such
a duty arises. In Heaven v. Pender,20 Brett, J., laid down
what purports to be a general test to determine this question:
"Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such
a position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not
use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger." It is not clear whether
this was meant to cover omissions as well as affirmative acts;
if it was, then the rule is much too broad because a duty to
take positive action to prevent injury to others does not arise
merely because such injury is probable. 2 l If A sees B, a deaf
19. Apparently the only case on the point in Missouri is McNamee v.
Mo. Pacific R. R. Co. (1896) 135 Mo. 440, which held that where X went
on a railroad track to save his horse and buggy from being injured and was
himself killed, there could be no recovery tho the engineer was negligent.
For cases in other jurisdictions denying recovery upon a similar state of
facts, see Morris v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (1896) 148 N. Y. 182,
42 N. E. 579; Pike v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada (1889) 39 Fed. 255. On
the other hand, where the plaintiff goes into a building negligently set on
fire by the defendant, in order to rescue his property from fire, the tendency
is to allow recovery. Pegram v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. (1905) 139
N. C. 303, 51 S. E. 975; Berg v. Great Northern R. R. Co. (1907) 70 Minn.
272, 73 N. W. 648; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Siler (1907) 229 Il1. 390,
82 N. E. 362. Perhaps the difference is to be accounted for by the
difference in the danger involved. Tho there is much talk in the cases
about assumption of risk, contributory negligence and legal cause, the
fundamental question is that of the duty of the defendant.
20. (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503, 509.
21. In Kenney v. H. & St. J. R. R. (1879) 70 Mo. 252, 257, it was
held that the employees of a railroad company owed no duty to the proprietors of land adjoining the railroad company's right of way to extinguish
a fire found by them on the right of way, unless the fire originated by the
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and blind stranger, about to be run over by a railroad train, he
is under no legal duty to try to save him, even if he could easily
do so. On the other hand, if it applies only to affirmative acts,
the rule is too narrow because under some circumstances there
is a duty to take positive precaution. Another defect of the rule
is that it affords no solution as to the existence and extent of a
duty of land occupiers towards trespassers, questions in regard
to which furnish the basis for a large part of the litigation in
negligence cases.
Justice Brett's proposition, however, has been cited with
approval in at least two Missouri decisions, Loehring v. Westlake Construction Co. 22 and Dillman v. Planters Hotel Co. 23

In

the former of these cases, however, the court's own statement
modified that of Justice Brett's so as to read as follows: "Whennegligence of the railroad. This case arose before the statute was passed
imposing an absolute liability upon railroads in regard to the spread of fire.
There are a few cases in Missouri as elsewhere which purport to hold
a defendant liable merely because of "precepts of humanity." In Layne
v. C. & A. R. R. (1913) 175 Mo. App. 34, 41, the plaintiff was a passenger
on the defendant's train; being old and infirm she requested the conductor
to assist her to alight from the car at her destination and upon his failure to
do so she undertook to alight without assistance and was injured. The
court in holding the defendant liable, said: "Where the carrier's agents
and servants have notice that a passenger's physical condition is such as
to require assistance in alighting from a car, and request for such assistance
is made, the precepts of humanity alone afford a sufficient reason why the
law should impose upon the carrier the duty of rendering such assistance
as is necessary to protect such passenger from injury." While the decision
may be supported as a reasonable extension of the duty of a common carrier
of passengers, the reasoning by which it arrives at the decision is open to
objection. Suppose for example that the plaintiff had asked a fellow
passenger to assist her to alight and the passenger could easily have done
so, would the "precepts of humanity" impose upon him a legal duty to
assist her? In Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co. (1915) 172 S. W. 43, where
the defendant's employee was injured so that he was in danger of bleeding
to death, it was held that altho the master was not legally responsible for
causing his injury he was under a legal duty to use ordinary care to furnish
medical aid. While the decision is based chiefly upon the ground of a
contract implied in fact, reference is made to principles of "humanity" and
the court cites with approval cases which seem to be based upon that
doctrine. In Trout v. The Watkins Livery & Undertaking Co. (1910) 148
Mo. App. 621, 636 where a private carrier who had undertaken to carry
the plaintiff from a hospital to her home and then had refused to complete
the undertaking, the court said: "the principles of humanity alone, unattended by any other obligation whatever, enjoins the duty of ordinary
care upon one knowing the condition of a sick person to look out for the
safety and welfare of those enfeebled."
22. (1906) 118 Mo. App. 163, 174.
23. (1911) 158 Mo. App. 136, 145.
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ever circumstances attending the situation are such that an
ordinarily prudent person could reasonably apprehend that as
a natural and probable consequence of his act, another person,
rightfully there, will be in danger of receiving injury, a duty to
exercise ordinary care to prevent such injury arises." The
words "rightfully there" exclude cases involving a duty to
trespassers and the word "act" seems, judging from the context, to exclude cases of omission to take affirmative action.
As thus construed, the doctrine is sound but not sufficiently
comprehensive to be of any value.
The truth is that Justice Brett's test does not bear examination; it is either too broad or too narrow. It is at least doubtful
whether any general test can be devised which will be of any
value. Historically, the common law did not start with any
test but satisfied itself with deciding the cases as they arose;
the only satisfactory way to answer the question therefore, is
to take up the different states of facts which have been adjudicated. As a matter of convenience these will be classified and
discussed in the following order: (A) duty of those who set or
keep forces in motion, (B) duty of land occupiers, (C) duty of
vendor or lessor of land, (D) duty of bailor, vendor, or manufacturer of chattels, (E) duty of keeper of animals, (F) duty in
regard to explosives, (G) duty in regard to fire, (H) duty in
regard to firearms, (I) duty of care as affected by statute or
ordinance, (J) duty based upon a gratuitous undertaking.
The above list while not exhaustive of the subject, includes
the most important classes of cases. The subject of liability
for the negligence of others will be taken up in the next article
in connection with the subject of imputed contributory negligence; and the subject of the duty owed by a master to his
servant will be dealt with in a later article on master and
servant.
A.

Duty of Those Who Set or Keep Forces in Motion

Apart from statute, those who set or keep forces in motion
must take ordinary care to prevent such forces from injuring the
persons or property of others. This applies not only when the
persons or property are where they have a right to be, for
3
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example, on the public highway or other public places or upon
the persons' own land, but also when they are wrongfully where
they are, provided the person setting or keeping the force in
motion knew of their proximity. Furthermore, if their presence
is to be reasonably expected, for example, at street or railroad
crossings in cities or villages, there is a duty to use reasonable
24

care to look out for them.

In Missouri, as in most other jurisdictions, there are
statutes describing what is to be done under certain circumstances. Revised Statutes 1909, § 3140 provides that when
a locomotive engine shall approach a public crossing the bell
shall be rung at a distance of at least eighty rods and kept ringing until it crosses the road or street, or that the whistle be
sounded at least eighty rods away, except in cities, and sounded
at intervals thereafter until the crossing is passed.
It is held in Burgher v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. 25 that performing

the statutory duty does not necessarily release the railroad
company; in that case a freight train had stopped at a crossing
longer than allowed by ordinance and persons who had been
waiting, including the plaintiff, were crossing between the cars;
the court held that it was for the jury to say whether under
these circumstances a warning should not have been given
when the train was started again. Nor does the statute dispense with the employment of a flagman at a crossing, if the
24. Brooks v. H. & St. J. R. R. Co. (1889) 35 Mo. App. 571 (railroad killing stock on public crossing); Moore v. K. C. etc. Ry. Co. (1894)
126 Mo. 265 (street railway company must use ordinary care to discover
persons on track or so near there as to render their position one of peril);
Bunyan v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (1894) 127 Mo. 12 (street railway must keep
vigilant outlook for persons on or approaching the track and when they
are discovered to be in danger it must use every possible effort consistent
with the safety of passengers, to avoid striking them).
The duty in regard to setting or keeping forces in motion extends to
all cases of active conduct. Thus, if one knows he is afflicted with a contagious disease, such as smallpox, he must use ordinary care not to communicate the disease to others; since his physical condition itself is actively
dangerous to those who are close to him, he must keep away from other
persons and if other persons approach him, he must notify them of the
fact so that they may protect themselves. Franklin v. Butcher (1910)
144 Mo. App. 660; Hendricks v. Butcher (1910) 144 Mo. App. 671. Upon
principle it would seem that there ought to be a duty upon every one to
use ordinary care to find out whether he has a contagious disease.
25. (1892) l12]Mo. 238,
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crossing is of such a character that a prudent railway would
employ a flagman.
There is apparently no Missouri statute fixing the maximum speed of railroad trains, this matter being left to cities
and villages for regulation, but a recent statute fixes the rate of
speed for motor vehicles on a public highway.26
B.

Duty of Land Occupiers

(1) Toward persons using the public highway. While a
land occupier does not owe persons using the adjacent highway
any positive duty to keep the highway in front of his premises
in repair and in safe condition for travel, 27 he does owe a duty
to guard an excavation on his own land which he makes so
close to the side walk as to render it dangerous to those who
are reasonably using the public highway. 28 So if there is a
wire fence along the highway he is under a duty towards travel29
ers to maintain it in a safe condition.
(2) Toward adjoining landowners. A land occupier making an excavation on his premises must use ordinary care to
avoid injury to his neighbor's buildings or land.30 So, if such
danger is likely to result from the erection of a building or a
wall.3 1 Also if a wall is left standing after the burning of a
building. 2 It has also been held that if there is a building on
the adjoining land, notice must be given of an intended excavation in order to afford the owner a chance to protect the
26. Laws of 1911, p. 327, amending Revised Statutes 1909, §8519,
which had been held constitutional in State v. Swaggerty (1907) 203 Mo.
517.
27. City of Independence v. Slack (1895) 134 Mo. 66, 76; Beck v.
Ferd-Heim Brewing Co. (1902) 167 Mo. 195, 200 (no duty to prevent
sliding of earth onto the sidewalk where caused entirely by natural forces).
28. Wiggan v. St. Louis (1896) 135 Mo. 558, 568; Buesching v.
St. Louis Gas Light Co. (1880) 73 Mo. 219 (cellar steps near sidewalk).
The guard itself must be secured. Butts v. Bank (1903) 99 Mo. App. 168
(loose heavy barbed railing).
29. Brown v. Wabash R. R. Co. (1901) 90 Mo. App. 20.
30. Charless v. Rankin (1867) 22 Mo. 566.
31. Lancaster v. Conn. Mut. Life Insurance Co. (1887) 92 Mo. 460.
32. Teepen v. Taylor (1909) 141 Mo. App. 282. In Lynds v. Clark
(1883) 14 Mo. App. 74, it was held that the duty extended to a contractor
who was erecting a building on adjacent land and whose materials were
damaged by the fall of the wall.
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building, and failure to do so is negligence. 3 After such
notice the responsibility for and cost of shoring up and taking
precaution to prevent injury to the building falls upon the
owner of the building. 4 Where the occupier has let the contract of erecting a building or wall with proper plans and
specifications, to an independent contractor, this relieves the
occupier of any liability for negligence of the independent
5
contractor but not apparently of the duty to give notice.
(3) Toward trespassers. The rule as to adult trespassers
is fairly simple: there is no duty toward a trespasser to keep the
premises in a safe condition or to warn of any perils thereon.
If the owner makes an excavation on his land remote from the
highway, there is no duty toward a trespasser to guard the
excavation or to warn him in any way of the danger. 6 The
occupant is not entitled however, to set spring guns or other
traps in order to catch or injure a trespasser, because the force
used is not appropriate in kind or suitable in degree for the purpose of removing him.
After the land occupier is aware of the presence of the
trespasser he must use due care, in changing the condition of
the premises, so as to avoid injuring him. This point is most
frequently raised in those cases where there is a trespasser on
a railroad track who is seen by a servant of the railroad company in charge of a train. The most difficult question is
whether there is any duty to look out for trespassers. On this
point the Missouri courts hold that if there is a reasonable
ground for expecting that there will be trespassers-as, for
33. Gerst v. St. Louis (1904) 185 Mo. 191.
34. Carpenter v. Realty Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 480. But if at
the time of giving notice the party letting the excavation undertakes, even
tho gratuitously, to support a part of the wall by leaving enough earth,
and the owner relies upon the promise, the former is liable to the latter if
he fails to perform the undertaking and damage results therefrom. Delaney v. Bowman (1899) 82 Mo. App. 252.
35. Lancaster v. Conn. Mut. Life Insurance Co. (1887) 92 Mo. 460.
Even if the plans and specifications are incomplete but should not have
misled the contractor, the result is the same. Newman v. Real Estate Co.
(1897) 73 Mo. App. 326.
36. Overholt v. Vieths (1887) 93 Mo. 422.
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example, in populous districts where trespassing is frequent37
there is a duty to use ordinary care to keep such a lookout.
As to trespassers who are children, the land occupier's duties
are greater than to trespassers who are adults, but the extent
of the difference is not easy to state. In Nagel v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co., 35 the petition stated that the defendant owned and operated
a railroad through the city of Jefferson and in connection
therewith used and operated a turntable so constructed and
arranged as to be easily turned around and caused to revolve;
that said turntable was situated in an open and public place
in the city; that children were in the habit of resorting to said
turntable and going to the same to play; that said turntable
was unfastened, without locks and unprotected by enclosures
or otherwise so as to prevent it being turned around at will
by small children-of all which the defendant had knowledge;
that the plaintiff's son, a child of tender years, was injured
thereby. The court held that the petition stated a good cause
of action and the judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.3 9
It has been sought to apply the principle of this case to other
attractive and dangerous things besides turntables, but with
little success. In Schmidt v. Kansas City Distilling Co., 40 a
37. Williams v. Kansas City (1888) 96 Mo. 275, 281; Guenther v.
St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 18. Where there is no reason
to suspect the presence of trespassers, there is no duty to keep a lookout.
Berry v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1894) 124 Mo. 223, 290; Thompson v. M. K. &
T. Ry. Co. (1902) 93 Mo. App. 548, 554. In some cases the rule is stated
without qualification that there is no duty to look out for trespassers, but
these are apparently cases where there was no reason to suspect their
presence. Rine v. C. & A. R. R. Co. (1885) 88 Mo. 392, 400; Barker v.
H. & St. J. R. R. Co. (1888) 98 Mo. 50.
In Maloy v. Wabash, etc.,
Ry. Co. (1884) 84 Mo. 270, and in Riley v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1896) 68 Mo.
App. 652, 661, it was held that while an engineer might reasonably assume
that a normal adult would get off the track before the train reaches him,
he has no right to make such an assumption in case of a child of tender
years or in case of any person who is known by the engineer to be or whose
appearance indicates that he is insane or badly intoxicated or otherwise
insensible of danger or unable to avoid it.
38. (1882) 75 Mo. 653.
39. In Koons v. St. L. & I. M. R. R. Co. (1877) 65 Mo. 592, the
legal duty of the railroad to guard a turntable from children was assumed
by the court in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff; and in Berry v.
St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. (1908) 214 Mo. 593, 608, a boy of four who was
crippled for life by a turntable was allowed to recover against the railroad.
40. (1886) 90 Mo. 284.
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child three years old lost its life by falling into a pool of hot
water made by the discharge of the water onto the defendant's
premises from its boilers through an escape pipe; the court held
that the"petition was defective because it should have averred
either that the place was attractive to children or that the
children in the neighborhood were in the habit of going there
to play or to watch the escape of steam. In Overholt v.
Vieths, 4' where a boy of eight was drowned in a pond of water
in a rock quarry, the court held that a verdict should have been
directed for the defendant, there being a clear case of no duty
on the defendant to fence or protect the pond. In Barney v.
H. & St. J. R. R. Co., 42 it was decided that moving railroad cars
were not "dangerous machines" within the principle of the
turntable cases, and no recovery was allowed to a child of six
who was injured while attempting to steal a ride on a freight
car in"a railroad yard which was much frequented by children.
In Woody v. Stifel,43 a boy of seven went to one of the cellar
windows of a building which was in the process of construction
about three feet from the street line; he tried to draw himself
up by taking hold of a stone which had been loosely placed
across the window sill; the stone fell and killed him. It was
not shown that children had been in the habit of playing
there nor that the place was attractive to children, and recovery
4
was denied. In Moran v. Pullman Palace Car Co., " a boy of
nine was drowned in a pond on defendant's unfenced city lot.
The court held that the defendant owed no duty to children
45
to fence the lot and denied relief. In Butz v. Cavanaugh, the
owner of a city lot was held not liable for injuries to a twelve
year old boy who went on the lot to get a piece of wire in an
old quarry and burned his feet in a smoldering fire. In Arnold
v. St. Louis,46 there was a pond partly on a street and partly on

defendant's private property; it was located near a public
41. (1887) 93 Mo. 432.
42. (1894) 126 Mo. 372. See also Rushenberg v. St. L., I. M. & S.
Ry. Co. (1891) 109 Mo. 112, 117 (a child eight years old was killed while
playing beneath the defendant's ice cars; recovery was denied).

43.
44.
45.
46:

(1894)
(1896)
(1896)
(1899)

126
134
137
152

Mo.
Mo.
Mo.
Mo.

295.
641.
503.
172.
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schoolhouse and when frozen over was attractive to children
of tender years for skating purposes; the defendant knew that
children were accustomed to skate there. It was held that
the petition stating these facts and the death of two children who
were drowned while skating did not state a cause of action. In
Carey v. Kansas City,47 a boy of eleven was drowned in a water
reservoir in a public park while trying to fish out a frog which
other boys had wounded; there was a high fence over which
the boy had climbed to get into the park and he had been
warned several times to keep out. Recovery was denied.
Apparently the latest case in Missouri raising the question is
Kelly v. Benas,48 in which it was held that a high lumber pile
was not within the principle of the turntable cases and therefore
recovery was denied for causing the death of a nine year old
boy. It seems fairly clear from these cases that it is unlikely
that the principle of the turntable cases will be extended in
Missouri beyond the precedents already established. 49 In this
respect judicial opinion and decisions in Missouri are in accord
with the trend of judicial opinion and decisions in other states.
The doctrine is now recognized to be anomalous and therefore
to be confined within narrow limits.
(4) Toward a licensee. Toward one who is sometimes
called a bare or mere licensee or volunteer, i.e., one who is on
the land for his own purposes merely by the sufferance of the
occupier, the duty of the latter does not vary much if at all
from that toward the trespasser.9 0 Even if permission is given,
either expressly or by implication, it is doubtful whether any
further duty arises, where the person coming on the premises
is doing so for his own use and benefit, except that there can be
no question in such a case that the land occupier in setting or
keeping forces in motion is under a duty to look out for such a
47. (1904) 187 Mo. 715.
48. (1908) 217 Mo. 1.
49. Houck v. C. & A. Ry. Co. (1905) 116 Mo. App. 559, 568. The
hot water pool case seems to be the only precedent other than cases of
turntables.
50. Berry v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1894) 124 Mo. 223, 288 (licensee by
permission or sufferance is no better off than a trespasser).
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licensee where his presence is reasonably to be anticipated. 5
Upon principle it would seem, at least in cases where permission
is expressly given, that the land occupier should be under a
duty to warn the licensee of hidden dangers of which the former
knows, and this is probably the law in Missouri. In Glaser v.
Rothchild, 2 the plaintiff went to the premises of the defendant
on business at the latter's invitation; the defendant was opening
his mail and asked the plaintiff to wait; the plaintiff then said
he would have to go to the toilet; the defendant called an
employee and told him to get a key to the toilet and show the
plaintiff to it. In following the employee's instructions the
plaintiff groped around the basement which was poorly lighted
and obstructed with boxes, and was injured by falling into an
elevator pit. The court held53 that the plaintiff while going to
the toilet was a licensee; that there was no evidence that the
defendant knew that the way to the toilet was obstructed by
boxes and hence there was no evidence of negligence, the
inference being, that if the defendant had known of the danger
he would have been under a duty to warn the licensee thereof.
In Eisenberg v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 4 the court said that licensees
"necessarily assume all patent and obvious risks," the implication being that if there was a hidden danger there was a duty to
warn. In Barry v. Cemetery Association," the plaintiff who
had a card of admission to the cemetery left the roadway and
walked across the ground; while thus walking she stepped
into a gopher hole which was concealed by the grass. The court
held that in thus walking off the roadway the plaintiff was
acting outside of her invitation and being therefore a licensee
51. Sack v. St. Louis Car Co. (1905) 112 Mo. App. 476 (plaintiff
a workman employed by contractor in erecting a building on the defendant's premises); Henry v. Disbrow M1ining Co. (1910) 144 Mo. App. 350
(servant going on his master's premises to see when his services will be
needed).

52.

(1904) 106 Mo. App. 418.

53.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of

Appeals was reversed on the ground that the plaintiff while hunting for
the lavatory had the right of a person invited on business; but there was
no criticism of the position of the Court of Appeals on the question of the
duty toward a licensee. (1909) 221 Mo. 180.
54. (1888) 33 Mo. App. 85, 91.
55. (1904) 106 Mo. App. 358.
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could not recover. There was nothing to show that the defendant knew of the existence of the hole.
(5) Toward invited persons. When a person has been
invited but not on business in which the land occupier is or
may be pecunarily interested, the authorities generally are
not agreed as to the extent of the land occupier's duty. In
Southcote v. Stanley,5 6 the court seemed to hold that a social
guest had no greater rights against the host than a servant or
member of the family would have and therefore could not
recover for an injury caused by the falling of a glass door; the
case arose upon a demurrer to the declaration which did not
allege that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition of
the door but merely alleged that by the negligence of the deAppafendant the said door was in a dangerous condition."
rently the only case on the point in Missouri is that of Houck
v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 11 in which the court said that if an engineer
invites a boy into a room in which there is unguarded machinery, he is under the legal duty of observing care for the boy's
safety, proportionate to the danger.
Toward a person who has been invited, either expressly
or by implication, upon business which is or may be of pecuniary
benefit to the land occupier, the latter is under a duty to use
reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition.5 9
56. (1856) 1 H. & N. 247.
57. Probably one invited on business could have recovered.
58. (1905) 116 Mo. App. 559.
59. Welch v. McAllister (1884) 15 Mo. App. 492, 497 (customer
fell down an unlighted hatchway in a meat store); Kean v. Schoening
(1903) 103 Mo. App. 77 (customer fell into trap door in floor); Kelly v.
Benas (1908) 217 Mo. 1, 9, "to invitees he owes an active duty to exercise

a reasonable care for their safety"; Davis v. Ringolsky (1910) 143 Mo. App.
364 (to a business visitor the defendant owes the duty of reasonable care
of which he cannot relieve himself by posting a sign or by contract with

a third party). See also Brook v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1904) 107 Mo.
App. 109, 116 (plaintiff on street car to negotiate with motorman for the
latter to make extra trip for extra pay); Sykes v. St. Louis & San Francisco
Railroad Co. (1901) 188 Mo. App. 193, 203 (plaintiff on railroad car on
business). The land occupier owes a similar duty to children of his
customers who accompany their parents. Miller v. Beck Dry Goods Co.
(1903) 104 Mo. App. 609 (plaintiff, a child of two, left in reception room
of department store by its mother); Butler v. C., R. I. & P. R. R. (1911)
155 Mo. App. 287 (plaintiff a boy of five accompanying his father, who was
unloading wheat into a grain car for shipment on the defendant's railroad).
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(6) Duty in regard to water escaping from land. In
Fletcher v. Rylands, ° the defendant had made a reservoir on
his land and filled it with water. The water passed down old
mine shafts on the defendant's land, thru old mine workings
and under intermediate land and reached the plaintiff's mine
causing much damage thereto. The court held that the defendant was liable without proof of negligence, an attempt being
made to generalize from the liability for nuisances, explosives,
and trespassing animals. The doctrine was meant to apply to
anything which an owner brings on his land and which is likely
to escape and to do damage if it escapes. Apparently however
it has never really been applied except to cases of escaping
water. The doctrine has been much modified in England
and has been followed very slightly in this country. There
seems to be no case in Missouri in which a defendant has been
held liable under it. In Murphy v. Gillum, 1 where the defendant maintained a pond and water seeped onto the plaintiff's
land adjoining, the court held that the defendant should not
be held liable in the absence of negligence if the seepage was
brought about by any unusual cause. In McCord Rubber Co.
Although the ground on which the positive duty is placed upon a land
occupier towards the business visitor is the benefit the former expects to
get from the business visit of the latter, the duty is not limited to cases of
actual benefit. Thus in Hartman v. Muehlebach (1895) 64 Mo. App. 565,
579, where the defendant invited the plaintiff, a customer, to visit a dangerous part of the premises, it was held that he was under a duty to give
warning of the danger even tho the acceptance of the invitation would not
benefit the defendant.
Tho the duty towards the business visitor is usually stated to be a
duty to use ordinary care to keep the premises in repair, perhaps a more
accurate statement gives him the option to warn of danger of which he
knows or could know by the exercise of ordinary care in finding out; but
since it is usually cheaper and less trouble in the long run to repair than it
is to find out the dangers and warn, it seems accurate enough to say that
the duty is to repair. In O'Donnell v. Patton (1893) 117 Mo. 13, 19, and
Shaw v. Goldman (1905) 116 Mo. App. 332, 338, the rule is stated to be
"that the proprietor owes the duty of ordinary care to keep said premises
in a reasonably safe condition * * * * and if the premises are not in such
reasonably safe condition, it is the duty of the proprietor to warn the
customer if he knows of it and if it is unknown to the customer." This
statement of the rule is defective in not including a duty to use reasonable
care to find out danger; the duty to warn of known dangers only is not the
equivalent of a duty to keep in repair.
60. (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
61. (1897) 73 Mo. App. 487.
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v. St. Joseph Water Co., 62 it was held that the doctrine of
Fletcher v. Rylands, even as later modified, did not apply to
water brought into a house through pipes in the ordinary
manner, because tho not technically a "natural user" of the
land the method is universally employed in cities. Where the
doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands is for any reason not applied, the
liability of a land occupier for the escape of water from his
premises is only for ordinary care under the circumstances.
(7) Duty of municipality towards the traveling public.
Closely analogous to the relation between the ordinary land
occupier and the business visitor is the relation between the
municipality and the traveling public, and the duty in most
jurisdictions in the United States is the same, viz., to use
ordinary care to keep in repair the places where the traveling
public has a right to be, or to warn of hidden dangers of which
the municipality knows or can find out by the exercise of
ordinary care. As stated in Maus v. City of Springfield, 3 "the
defendant was bound to exercise ordinary care to keep its
streets in a condition of reasonable safety for the use of the
public by night as well as by day." In most jurisdictions this
obligation rests only upon chartered municipal corporations,
i.e., cities, towns and villages, and not upon what are sometimes
called quasi-municipal corporations, i.e.,counties and townships;
the reason for this distinction is not clear and some states hold
the county also liable. 4 In England and Canada, on the other
hand, neither county nor city is held civilly liable apart from
statute.6 5
In Kileyv. City of Kansas,66 the court said:

"*

*

* gener-

ally municipal corporations are not answerable in actions of
tort for the non-execution of powers of that [public] character.
Buc the liability for a failure to keep the streets in a reasonably
safe condition, it is generally said, arises by implication from
the nature of the subject, and the vast powers conferred upon
such corporations, including the exclusive control of the streets.
62.
63.

(1904) 181 Mo. 678.
(1890) 101 Mo. 613, 617.

64.
65.
66.

Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) §§ 1689, 1714, passim.
Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) § 1687.
(1885) 87 Mo. 103, 106.
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This obligation is not limited to defects existing in the streets;
dangerous ditches, and excavations by the side of the highways
must be guarded, and after notice of such defects, the city will
be held liable for injuries to travelers using ordinary care,
caused by the neglect to put up barriers."
The liability is limited to those who are using the street
for purposes of travel; if the person injured was not using the
street for such purposes there can be no recovery. 67 If the
street is rendered unsafe by the walls of a house left standing
after a fire, there is a duty to use ordinary care to secure the
walls or to have them removed."
The liability of the city or town includes the sidewalks. 9
On the other hand, the liability does not necessarily extend to
the whole width of the street; thus, in Ely v. St. Louis ° where
a street eighty feet wide was established in a new section of the
city and the city by ordinance declared that an improvement
thirty feet wide thereon was sufficient temporarily for the
public needs, it was held that there was no duty as to the other
71
fifty feet, it having been left in its natural condition.
When the city has caused or authorized the defect in the
street, no notice is necessary in order to fix upon it the duty to
use ordinary care to repair or warn; 2 but where the city is not
in any way responsible for the existence of the defect, it is
necessary for the plaintiff to show either that the proper city
officials knew of the defect or that by the exercise of ordinary
care they could have discovered it in time to have protected the
plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary care. 3
67.
68.
69.
70.

Kiley v. City of Kansas (1885) 87 Mo. 103, 107.
Grogan v. Broadway Foundry Co. (1885) 87 Mo. 321.
Hill v. City of Sedalia (1895) 64 Mo. App. 494.
(1904) 181 Mo. 723.

71. See Bassett v. City of St. Joseph (1873) 53 Mo. 290, 303; Craig v.
City of Sedalia (1876) 63 Mo. 417. The mere fact that the plaintiff

temporarily lost control of the horse he was driving does not prevent his

recovery for damage to the horse due to a defective street, provided he
was in the exercise of due care. Hull v. City of Kansas (1874) 54 Mo. 598,
601. 72. Lindsay v. Kansav City (1905) 195 Mo. 166, 178.
73.

Ball v. Neosho (1904) 109 Mo. App. 683.
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C.

Duty of Vendor or Lessor of Land

If one sells land upon which he has erected a nuisance he
74
does not,of course, escape his liability therefor by such transfer.
As to a defect in the condition of the premises which does not
amount to a nuisance, the vendor would upon principle cease
to be liable after the vendee has gone
into possession, at least
75
after the vendee knows of the defect.
If one leases to a tenant land on which there is a nuisance
he obviously does not escape liability thereby.7 6 So, if the premises are in such a condition that ordinary use by the tenant
must necessarily create a nuisance, 77 or if the lease contemplates
that the lessee will erect a nuisance. 78 Even where the defect
in the condition of the premises was not considered to be a
nuisance, the lessor may be liable for an injury occurring to a
third person properly on the premises after the tenant takes
possession. 79 On the other hand, if the premises are in repair
at the time of the lease, and no nuisance or negligent act of
the lessee is to be reasonably contemplated, the landlord is
under no tort liability either to the tenant or a third person
for failure to keep the premises in repair. 80
74. Plumer v. Harper (1824) 3 N. H. 88. The vendee in such a
case becomes liable only after a notice or request to abate the nuisance.
Rychlicki v. City of St. Louis (1893) 115 Mo. 662; Gleason v. Kirksville
(1909) 136 Mo. App. 521, 524.
75. Palmore v. Morris, Tasker & Co. (1897) 182 Pa. 82 (plaintiff,
a boy of eight, was killed by the fall of a partially open gate; it did not
appear positively whether the vendee knew of the defect or not, but he
probably did; the court said "the law presumes that the grantee examined
the property and was cognizant of its situation, surroundings, the character
of the structures on it and the condition of its repair"). There seems to
be no Missouri case upon the point.
76. Owings v. Jones (1856) 9 Md. 108.
Gordon v. Peltzer (1893) 56
Mo. App. 599, 603 (" If the landlord shall erect a nuisance and let the same
to a tenant, then both will be held liable for the consequent injuries").
77. Knauss v. Brua (1884) 107 Pa. 85 (defective cesspool).
78. Harris v. James (1876) 45 L. J. Q. B. 545 (lime kilns erected by
the tenant).
79. Mancuso v. Kansas City (1898) 74 Mo. App. 138; Stoetzele v.
Swearingen (1901) 90 Mo. App. 588. The tenant himself in such a case
would not be able to recover from the landlord unless the injury to him
was caused by a hidden defect of which the landlord knows and which
was not known to the tenant or discoverable by him by careful inspection.
McKenzie v. Chatham (1891) 83 Me. 543; Ira v. Jordan (1892) 111 Mo. 424.
80. Ward v. Fagin (1890) 101 Mo. 669; Fehlis'uer v. City of St.
Louis (1903) 178 Mo. 635 (cellar door in sidewalk).
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Where the landlord has rented only part of the premises, as
in case of apartment houses, he owes the same duty to tenants
and their guests with respect to that part of the premises
retained which a land occupier owes to a person invited on
business. 81 The tenants stand in the position of business
visitors here because the renting of the premises to them is a
matter of profit to the landlord and the presence of guests
invited by the tenant must reasonably have been contemplated
by him.
Even tho the landlord is under no duty whatever in regard to
keeping the premises in repair, if he undertakes to do a particular
piece of repair work he must use ordinary care in performing
it; if, having so undertaken the work he leaves the premises in
a dangerous condition, he will be liable to the tenant or the
tenant's guest who is injured thereby. 82 If however the failure
of the landlord to carry through his undertaking as planned
and expected does not result in leaving the premises in a
83
dangerous condition, there is no liability.
D.

Duty of Bailor, Vendor, or Manufacturer of Chattels

If one lends a chattel gratuitously and knows that there is
a latent defect making it unfit and dangerous for the purposes
for which it was lent, he is liable for injuries resulting therefrom
to the borrower or those expected to use it. 84 This is analogous
to the liability of a land occupier towards persons who have
been expressly or impliedly permitted to enter upon the land
for their own purposes and following this analogy, there is
probably no liability in the absence of actual knowledge of the
81. McGinley v. Alliance Trust Co. (1901) 168 Mo. 257; Herdt v.
Koenig (1909) 137 Mo. App. 589 (yard dangerous because adjacent to a
quarry without a sufficient fence between them).
82. Little v. McAdaras (1889) 38 Mo. App. 187 (fixing privy seat);
Finer v. Nichols (1911) 158 Mo. App. 539, (1913) 175 Mo. App. 523
(fixing privy floor; tenant's wife fell through the floor and suffered serious
injury resulting in a miscarriage).
83. Glenn v. Hill (1907) 210 Mo. 291, 298 (landlord undertook
gratuitously to replace the old furnace with a new one; after taking out
the old furnace, there was a long delay in putting in a new one and the
tenant became ill with pneumonia and died).
84. Blakemore v. Bristol &, Exeter Ry. Co. (1858) 8 E. & B. 1035.
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defect. If, however, the bailment is for the benefit not only of
the bailee but also of the bailor the duty of the bailor not only
to the bailee but to those persons who are likely to use the
chattel is to use due care that the chattel so bailed is fit for the
purpose for which it was intended.8 5 While this principle
applies to an initial carrier so that it is under a duty to see that
the cars which it furnishes are safe and to a final carrier so that
it is under a duty to see that the cars which it receives from
the previous carrier are in repair, it has not been applied to an
intermediate carrier, apparently upon the ground that it is
under a duty to receive the car; but the reason does not seem
conclusive. 56

Where the bailment is for the purpose of having the bailee
repair the chattel for the bailor, it has been held 7 that the
bailor is under a duty to notify the bailee of such defects therein
as are likely to result in injury during the process of repairing.
Where the bailment is by way of lease or hire of a chattel, the
benefit to the bailor being the compensation paid for the use
of it, it would seem upon principle that the lessor would be
under a duty to those who would reasonably be expected to
use the chattel, to use ordinary care to furnish a chattel reasonably fit for the purpose, just as in the mutual benefit cases
previously discussed. This seems to be the weight of authority
but apparently there is no case in Missouri upon the point. 8
85. Roddy v. The Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 234, 249
(a railroad furnished cars to a quarry owner upon the latter's side track;
it was held that there was a duty on the railroad toward the quarry owner
and his employees to use ordinary care to select proper cars because the
bailment was for their mutual profit). See also Fassbinder v. Missouri
Pacific Ry. Co. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 563, 569 (a railroad furnished a
defective car to a gravel company in carrying out a mutual arrangement;
it was held liable to the servant of the gravel company who was injured
by the defective car while using it.)
86. Sykes v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. (1903) 178 Mo. 693,
714-"it is no part of the duty of an intermediate carrier to examine a car
to see whether it is in safe condition for any one to enter upon it for the
purpose of unloading it when it reaches its destination, nor if it discovers
it is not in such a safe condition, to repair it, or to set it out, or to change the
load to another and safe car, nor can an intermediate carrier refuse to
receive a car from a connecting line for any such reason."
87. King v. National Oil Co. (1899) 81 Mo. App. 155 (repairing oil
wagons).
88. Glen v. Winters (1896) 40 N. Y. Supp. 659 (coach hired by social
club; it was held that there was a duty towards those who were reasonably
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Where the chattel has been sold outright instead of bailed
or leased, the tort liability of a vendor or manufacturer seems
to be limited to cases where the vendor knew of the defect unless
the chattel sold is one dangerous to life, in which latter case
the vendor or manufacturer is under a duty to use ordinary care
to warn prospective users of the chattel of the danger. The
distinction between articles dangerous to life and those dangerous in a less degree, seems difficult to support as a judicial
distinction. Upon principle it would seem that there should
be a duty on all vendors and manufacturers towards those who
might reasonably be expected to use the chattel to warn of all
defects of which they might know by the exercise of ordinary
In Missouri apparently
care, whether dangerous to life or not.
in order to enforce liability in the absence of knowledge of the
danger, the chattel must be one which in its natural condition
is dangerous to life. Thus in Heizer v. Kingsland & Douglass
Manufacturing Co., 19 it was held that since a threshing machine
was not necessarily inherently dangerous to life the defendant
manufacturer was not liable for the explosion of a cylinder
where it was not shown that the defendant knew of its dangerous
condition. In Darks v. Scudder-Gale Grocer Co.,5 0 on the other
expected to use the coach, including the plaintiff, a guest of the club, to

use ordinary care to provide a coach reasonably fit for the purpose for

which it was hired); Hadley v. Cross (1861) 34 Ver. 586 (livery stable
keeper is under duty to use ordinary care to see that the horses and
carriages are reasonably fit for use).

The decision in Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M. & W. 109, while
apparently contra, may be justified on the ground that the plaintiff, a
mailcoachman, was relying in his declaration on a breach of contract
between his master and the defendant, instead of relying upon the breach
of a tort duty.

In England, the beneficiary of a contract-except in

particular cases-cannot recover on the contract. In most of the United
States, including Missouri, the beneficiary is allowed to recover where
there was an intent that he should be benefited. Hence in a case like
Glen v. Winters, supra, the Missouri court might conceivably allow the
guest to recover on a contract implied in fact between the bailor and
bailee, made for the benefit of the guest of the club.

89.
90.

(1892) 110 Mo. 605, 615.
(1910) 146 Mo. App. 246, 260 (ginger extract put up for medicinal

purposes contained wood alcohol; it was sold by the defendant, a whole-

sale grocer in St. Louis, to a merchant in Oklahoma who took the same as
a medicine and died from the effects of it; while the party using the
chattel here was a vendee the court does not place its decision on this
ground but upon the broader ground of a tort duty to those who might

reasonably be expected to use the article).
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hand, recovery was allowed because the chattel sold was a
poison, the court stating the law to be that "a manufacturer
or dealer will be held liable to one injured by poison sold to
him, even tho such person was not the purchaser of the same
from the dealer, provided the injury was the direct, natural
and probable consequence of the dealer's negligence in preparing
the poisonous article." In Fischer v. Golladay,91 the plaintiff
sent by an agent to the defendant a druggist for some sulphuric
ether; the defendant sent instead some sulphuric acid without
labeling it in any way; the plaintiff used the sulphuric acid
before detecting the difference and was injured. The act of
the defendant was in violation of a statute,9 2 but the court
held that even in the absence of statute it would have been
negligence to sell to one not the immediate consumer a deadly
poison without labeling it, and that telling the plaintiff's agent
orally that it was poison was not a fulfilment of this duty to
the plaintiff. Where the party injured knew that the article
was posionous, however, no recovery was allowed tho the statute
requiring a label had not been complied with. 93
E.

Duty of Keeper of Animals

(1) Trespasses to land. While one who drives domestic
animals on the public highway is liable only for ordinary care
under the circumstances, 94 the English common law rule was
that the keeper of animals was liable irrespective of negligence
if his cattle, horses, sheep or swine strayed from his land upon
that of his neighbor and damaged his neighbor's land or crops.
As the rule was sometimes stated, one was under an absolute
duty to fence his own live stock in, but not to fence others' live
stock out. 95 In states of this country which had in the early
91.
92.
93.
94.
778-was
95.

(1889) 38 Mo. App. 531.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 4823.
Fowler v. Randall (1903) 99 Mo. App. 407.
The Missouri statute on the subject-Revised Statutes 1909, §
probably not meant to impose liability apart from negligence.
The rule while applying to most domestic animals does not apply

to dogs or cats because of the difficulty of keeping such animals under
restraint, the slightness of the damage which their wandering usually
caused, and the common usage of mankind to allow them a wider liberty.
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days a large amount of public unenclosed land used for grazing
purposes, this rule of the common law was held inapplicable
and the reverse rule adopted, viz., that one need not fence his
own cattle in but must fence others' cattle out.96 Some of the
prairie states have by statute gone back to the old common law
rule and in Missouri there is now statutory local option upon
the subject.9 7 Where the prairie rule is in force the owner of
animals is not liable for their trespasses on the unenclosed lands
of another; and if the latter has not properly complied with the
statute9" requiring the erection of fences, he is made liable by
statute99 for double damages if such animals are injured; and it
has been held 1"' that this includes any damage inflicted upon
the animals in driving them off the land, whether he was careful
or negligent, humane or malicious in driving them out. If the
animals break through a fence which complies with the statutory requirements there is liability irrespective of negligence, but
it attaches in Missouri only to the agister if the cattle are in
possession of an agister at the time. 1 '
The owner of the cattle
in such a case is liable only where he "purposely selected an
10 2
irresponsible or incompetent or untrustworthy bailee.' 1
(2) Injuries other than trespasses to land. As to the liability for acts of domestic animals other than trespasses to land,
the English common law rule was that one was liable regardless
96. McLean v. Berkabile (1907) 123 Mo. App. 647, 652 and cases
cited. In Missouri the English common law rule was not, however,

rejected as between adjoining proprietors whose lands are enclosed by

continuous outside fences. In such cases where no division fence has been
established between the farms either under Revised Statutes 1909, § 6459
or by agreement of the parties, each proprietor is required to confine his
domestic animals to his own land and is liable to his neighbor for any dam-

ages sustained from their escape to the land of the latter. O'Riley v.
Diss (1890) 41 Mo. App. 184, 189; Gillespie v. Hendren (1903) 98 Mo.
App. 622, 626.
97. Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 772, 790. The option may be exercised either by counties, § 780, or by five or more townships in any one

county, § 784; after five or more townships have adopted the statutory
rule forbidding animals to be at large, any adjoining township may vote
thereon, § 787.
98. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6454.
99. Revised Statutes 1909, § 6458.
100. Woods v. Carty (1904) 110 Mo. App. 416.
101. Reddick v. Newburn (1882) 76 Mo. 423.
102. Upon principle it would seem there should be a duty to use
ordinary care to select a competent agister.
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of the amount of care used where he knew of the dangerous
tendency of the animal.1 °3 In order to prove scienter, i.e.,
knowledge of vicious propensity, it is not necessary that there
should be notice of the particular sort of act which produced
the injury to the plaintiff; for example, where the plaintiff has
been bitten by defendant's dog it is not necessary that the dog
should have bitten another person in order to show scienter;
it would be enough if it were known by the defendant that the
dog had attempted to bite. 1 4 That a dog is kept as a watch
dog and is kept tied by day and turned loose at night has been
held sufficient evidence of scienter. 0 5 The statute authorizing
the recovery of damages for the killing of sheep or other animals
107
by dogs, 10 6 dispenses with the proof of scienter.
F. Duty in Regard to Explosives
Whether one who stores or uses dangerous explosives is
merely under a duty to use ordinary care under the circumstances, which would mean a high degree of care in fact, or
whether he is liable at his peril for damage caused, i.e., liable
no matter how much care is used, is not very clear from the
cases. In Hoffman v. Walsh, 1° 8 the defendant in blasting rocks
103.

Bell v. Leslie (1887) 24 Mo. App. 661 (while the horse was in

the exclusive control of a bailee the liability attached only to the latter);
Marritt v. Matchet (1908) 135 Mo. App. 176 (keeper of dog liable at peril
if he has notice of vicious propensity, ownership of the animal being immaterial); Shroeder v. Fayres (1892) 49 Mo. App. 470 (agister having a
known vicious horse in pasture is liable to the owner of a colt killed by
the horse).
Where a domestic animal while trespassing commits damage other
than damage to the land, the common law rule seems to be that the owner
of the animal is liable therefor without proof of scienter, such damage
being considered as aggravation of the trespass and governed by the same
rules. Decker v. Gammon (1857) 44 Me. 322 (defendant's horse while
trespassing severely injured the plaintiff's horse). The court in Beckett v.
Beckett (1871) 48 Mo. 396 gave a similar decision, apparently forgetting
that Missouri did not have the common law rule as to trespassing animals.
The case has not been cited in any later Missouri case and apparently the
question has not been raised again.
104. O'Neill v. Blase (1902) 94 Mo. 648, 667 (personal injuries
caused by the defendant's cow).
tjA 105. Speckmann v. King (1899) 79 Mo. App. 376.
, 106. Revised Statutes 1909, § 855.
i' 107. Jacobsmeyer v. Poggemoeller (1892) 47 Mo. App. 560; Adams v
Brown (1909) 120 Mo. App. 434.
108.. (1905) 117 Mo. App. 27P.
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on his own land threw a rock which injured the plaintiff on
the adjoining land five hundred feet away; the court held that
since there was a direct invasion of the possession of a neighboring proprietor, the defendant was liable without proof of
negligence and it was immaterial that it was the employee of
the neighboring proprietor who was injured and not the proprietor himself; but that as to other injuries he was liable only
if negligent. In Thurmond v. Ash Grove White Lime Association,'0 9 where the defendant's quarry was in a thinly peopled
rural neighborhood where the defendant had been quarrying
for years and the plaintiff had leased and sold land to the defendant for quarry purposes, the plaintiff sued for recovery for
damage to his house and cistern caused by a heavy explosion,
the plaintiff not being in possession of the farm at the time and
the stone thrown on the land not causing any damage to the
freehold, it was held that he was not entitled to recover without
proof of negligence, tho the court intimates that the plaintiff's
son who was in possession might have recovered. In Scalpino
v. Smith,'" the defendant, who was engaged as a railroad contractor in building a railroad through the outer residence district of Kansas City, kept about three thousand pounds of
dynamite stored in two small frame buildings close to his work;
while the defendant's employee was thawing out some dynamite
for use, all the dynamite exploded and the shock seriously
injured the plaintiff, who lived one thousand and thirty feet
from the storehouses, by throwing her out of bed against a
stove. It was held that the defendant's act in thus storing
large quantities of dynamite so close to residences was in the
nature of a nuisance and that the defendant was liable without
proof of negligence.
The result of the cases seems to be that if the explosion
causes a trespass to the person or property of another, the
owner of the explosives is liable irrespective of negligence;
if the explosive has been stored in large quantities near dwelling
109. (1907) 125 Mo. App. 73.
110. (1911) 154 Mo. App. 524. See also French v. Center Creek
Powder Manufacturing Co. (1913) 173 Mo. App. 220, 226 (defendant stored
nitroglycerine on its own premises near the plaintiff's house; an explosion
caused a picture to fall upon the plaintiff who was ill in bed).
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houses it is considered to be a nuisance and no amount of
care can relieve from liability in case of damage; in other cases
the liability is only for ordinary care under the circumstances."'
G.

Duty in Regard to Fire

By the old English common law the person who kindled
a fire was absolutely liable to others whose property was injured
by the fire's spreading, and there was a presumption that a fire
originating upon a man's premises was kindled by him or his
servants. This presumption was later removed by a statute
in England but the absolute liability in that jurisdiction probably remains. In the United States and Canada, however, the
law of England on this point has not been generally followed,
the liability being only for ordinary care under the circumstances. Such is the law in Missouri today apart from statute." 2
By statute"' railroad corporations are made liable to
persons and corporations whose property may be injured or
destroyed by fire communicated directly or indirectly by
locomotive engines in use on the railroad owned or operated
by such railroad corporation. Under this statute it has been
held that an allegation of negligence is not supported by proof
that the fire was communicated from the defendant's engine;
the plaintiff must rely upon the statutory cause of action in his
petition; but the fact that his petition unnecessarily states
negligence will not prevent his recovery upon the statute where
111.

In the following cases the defendant was held liable only for

negligence: Fuchs v. St. Louis (1895) 133 Mo. 168 (explosion of coal oil
in public sewer; the oil had been turned into the sewer to prevent its
being burned in a conflagration); Dowell v. Guthrie (1889) 99 Mo. 653
(plaintiff injured by the defendant's discharge of fireworks; it was held
that while the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the negligence of the

defendant, it was not necessary to prove the particular act which caused
the discharge); Brannock v. Elmore (1892) 114 Mo. 55 (the violation
of an ordinance prohibiting blasting of rock without first covering it
with timber was held to be negligence).

112. Catron v. Nichols (1883) 81 Mo. 80 (farmer sets fire to his
stubble field for purpose of husbandry); Garrison v. Graybill (1892) 52
Mo. App. 580 (spark from threshing machine burns the plaintiff's grain
stack); Steele v. Darner (1907) 124 Mo. App. 338 (farmer sets back fire
to protect against forest fire and allows it to spread to plaintiff's land).

113.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 3151.
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the statute is relied upon in the petition." 4 The plaintiff is
bound to prove that the fire was emitted from the locomotive
and not from some other part of the train in order to take
advantage of the statutory liability.'"
H.

Duty in Regard to Firearms

The cases in Missouri dealing with liability for damage
caused by firearms present two differences from other cases
of liability for negligence. Following the old English case, of
Weaver v. Ward,"6 it has been held that if the plaintiff proves
at the trial that he was injured directly and immediately by
the discharge of a firearm in the hands of the defendant, the
burden is upon the defendant to prove that it was utterly
without his fault. Thus not only is the plaintiff relieved in
such cases from his usual burden of proving the negligence of
the defendant, but the standard of care as stated is higher
than the standard of ordinary care. The law as to responsibility for firearms in Missouri is thus between liability at peril.
on the one hand and liability for ordinary care on the other." 7
I.

Duty as Affected by Statute or Ordinance

The duty to use care may be affected by statute in either
of two ways. The first is by requiring that under certain
circumstances certain things shall be done, the statute being
passed for the purpose of avoiding injury to persons or property.
Such a statute does not really create a new cause of action, but
merely requires specific things to be done instead of leaving the
question to the jury to decide whether in the particular case
ordinary care under the circumstances was used. It has
been uniformly held in Missouri that the violation of such a
statute is negligence per se, the defendant being liable not for
114. Riley v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. (1907) 124 Mo.
App. 278.
115. Waddell v. C. & A. Railway Co. (1909) 146 Mo. App. 604,
608. But it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Hudspeth v.
St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad (1913) 172 Mo. App. 579.
116. (1616) Hobart 134.
117. Conway v. Read (1877) 66 Mo. 346; Morgan v. Mulhall (1908)
214 Mo. 451.
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any damage that may happen but only for such damage as was
proximately caused by such violation.118 Apparently, therefore
an allegation of negligence would be supported by proof of
violation of the statute tho the statute is not referred to in the
petition.
The other kind of statute affecting the duty to use care is
that which makes a defendant liable irrespective of negligence
where, apart from statute, he would be only bound to use ordinary care. A statute of this sort has already been referred to," 9
making a railroad liable absolutely, i.e., without proof of
negligence for property injured or destroyed by fire communicated by a locomotive. If a petition charges negligence
it is a variance for the plaintiff to rely upon the statute at the
trial, 2 ° because the statute is considered as creating a new and
different cause of action.
As to whether the rule applying to statutes applies also to
municipal ordinances there is a conflict of authority in the
United States. The minority position is that the legislature
cannot delegate to the municipality the power to create civil
liability between individuals but only the power to fix limited
penalties payable to the corporation.' 2 ' The majority view
makes no distinction between legislative and municipal enactment, holding that since the ordinance is valid for one purpose,
it has just the same effect as if the legislature itself passed it.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Jackson v. K. C. etc. Ry. Co.,' 22
and in Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co.,' 2" has now adopted the
majority rule, definitely refusing to follow such of the earlier
1 24
cases as were contra.
118.

For examples of statutes, see Revised Statutes 1909, § 3140,

requiring the blowing of a locomotive whistle, etc., while approaching a

public crossing; also Revised Statutes 1909, § 8519, since amended,
fixing the rate at which motor vehicles may travel on public highways.
119. Revised Statutes 1909, § 3151.
120. Riley v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad (1907) 124 Mo.
App. 278.
121. Becker v. Schutte (1900) 85 Mo. App. 57, 62.
122. (1900) 157 Mo. 621, 641.
123. (1905) 107 Mo. 135.
124. See especially Fath v. Tower Grove & Lafayette Ry. Co. (1891)
105 Mo. 545, which held that there was no civil liability unless the railroad

contracted with the city to comply with the ordinance; Byington v. St.
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J.

Duty Based upon a Gratuitous Undertaking

Where one gratuitously undertakes to do something which
he is under no legal obligation to do, it is clear that in performing
the act he must use ordinary care not to cause damage to others;
and this applies not only to damage occurring while the act is
being performed but also to damage resulting later, due to the
increased danger which the performance of the act has brought
about. In Little v. McAdaras,125 a landlord who-as we have
seen-was under no duty apart from contract to keep the premises
in repair for a tenant, sent employees on the premises to clear
the privy vault; in order to do so the seat was taken up and
later replaced in an insecure manner so that the tenant's wife
in using it was injured. The court said: "altho there may have
been no duty upon the defendant, as landlord, to keep the
premises in repair, there was a duty upon him, just as there
would have been upon a mere stranger, to restore the privy seat
to a condition as safe as when it was removed." In Finer v.
Nichols,12 6 the plaintiff and her husband who were occupying
premises as tenants of the defendant complained to the defendant that the privy floor was out of repair and unsafe; the
defendant thereupon sent a man to make the repairs; he,
instead of removing the old floor and making a new one, merely
drove some nails into the old and decayed boards in order to
fasten them in place; the defendant then informed the plaintiff
that the floor had been repaired and was safe for use. Thereafter
upon the plaintiff's entering the privy one of the old boards broke
Louis R. R. Co. (1898) 147 Mo. 673. For examples of ordinances see
Jackson v. K. C. Ft. S. & M. Ry. (1900) 157 Mo. 621, 641; Hutchison v.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (1900) 161 Mo. 247, 253, (fixing the speed at
which railroad trains may run within the city limits); Brannock v. Elmore
(1892) 114 Mo. 55, (prohibiting the blasting of rock without first covering
it with timber); Becker v. Schutte (1900) 85 Mo. App. 57, (forbidding the
leaving of an unsecured horse on the street. Where the city is primarily
liable to perform a duty, such as to use ordinary care to keep the sidewalks
clear of snow and ice and in good repair for travel, an ordinance requiring
abutting owners to perform such a duty is held not to create a civil liability toward persons injured because the purpose of the ordinance is
primarily to protect the city and only incidentally to protect travellers;

Jackson v. K. C. Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co. (1900) 157 Mo. 621, 636 and cases
cited.
125. (1889) 38 Mo. App. 187.
126. (1913) 175 Mo. App. 525.
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under her and she was severely injured. It was held that she
was entitled to recover.
It is to be noticed that in both the cases just discussed the
peril was unknown to the plaintiff, who relied upon the
express or implied representation of the defendant as to the
safe condition of the premises."' On the other hand, in
Glenn v. Hill"" where the landlord, having undertaken gratuitously to replace the old furnace in the tenant house with a
new one, delayed a long time in putting in the new furnace after
removing the old and the tenant died of pneumonia, the danger
was patent and damage might have been avoided by putting
up stoves or moving out of the house, holding the landlord
responsible for rendering the house untenantable. It was
held in that case that the tenant's wife could not recover for
wrongfully causing the death of her husband.
Where the danger has not been increased by the defendant's
undertaking and the performance thereof, there is obviously no
127. The same principle applies to assurances of future safety. In
Delaney v. Bowman (1899) 82 Mo. App. 252, the defendant who was
about to make an excavation on his own land gave notice thereof to an
adjoining land owner but gratuitously undertook to leave enough earth
to provide lateral support for the rear part of the plaintiff's wall; it was
held that the plaintiff had a right to rely upon such a promise and if the
defendant failed to leave sufficient earth to protect the wall he was liable
for the consequences.
128. (1907) 210 Mo. 291, 298. In Graff v. Lemp Brewing Co.
(1910) 145 Mo. App. 364, the defendant had leased to the plaintiff a building the floor of which was in such a dangerous condition that its use by the
plaintiff was attended with risk of personal injury. With knowledge of
this condition the landlord, as a part of the contract of letting, promised to
repair the floor. The landlord failed to make the repairs and the tenant
while using the floor sustained personal injuries in consequence of its
The tenant sued in tort; the court held that while
defective condition.
ordinarily the mere existence of a contract did not give rise to a tort
obligation, yet the promise of a landlord to repair a defect of a character
so dangerous that it would be a constant menace to the personal safety of
the tenant, created a duty the negligent breach of which would constitute
a tort. Altho the court declared that there was nothing in the decision of
Glenn v. Hill inconsistent with this view, it seems difficult if not impossible
to reconcile the two cases. The case is not analogous to the cases holding
that the vendor of a chattel which is dangerous to life is under a duty
towards those who may reasonably use the chattel, because such a duty
is performed by warning of the danger, whereas in the Graff case the plaintiff knew of the danger before taking the lease or entering into occupation
of the premises. As an original proposition there is something to be said
for the decision of the court because of the inadequacy of any other remedy
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liability. In Barney v. H. & St. J. Ry. Co., 12 9 the railroad
company had instructed its employees to keep trespassers out
of its yard but its employees did not at all times obey the
instruction and frequently allowed the trespassing boys to ride
on the cars; the court held that since there was no legal obligation in the first place to keep trespassers out, the failure to
perform its undertaking did not make it liable. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff has a right to rely and has relied upon the
defendant's continued performance of his gratuitous undertaking, and a cessation of the performance would place the
which the tenant has in such a case; but it represents a departure from
principles which have been considered settled, the extent of which departure it is difficult now to estimate.
Since the above paragraph was written, the decision in Graff v. Lemp
Brewing Co. has been apparently overruled by the decisions in Dailey v.
Vogl (1915) 173 S. W. 707. In the latter case the defendant had rented
certain premises to the plaintiff's husband; after the plaintiff and her
husband had occupied the premises for some time they became estranged
and separated; the plaintiff agreed to remain as defendant's tenant at the
same rent her husband had been paying upon the defendant's agreeing
to repair a board walk on the premises. The defendant later failed to
repair the walk tho frequently requested to do so, and the plaintiff
broke through it and was injured. The judges all agreed that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in tort and'that the judgment for the
plaintiff should be reversed, but differing in their reasoning they delivered
separate opinions. Ellison, J.'s opinion was that the decision in Graff
v. Lemp Brewing Co. was wrong and should be overruled. Johnson, J.,
thought it should not be overruled, distinguishing it from the decision in
Glenn v. Hill in that in the former case the contract to repair was a part of
the original letting, while in the latter it was made during the tenancy. This
distinction is difficult to justify as a matter of principle, and apparently
has no authority to sustain it; but even assuming the distinction, the
learned judge apparently overlooked the fact that in Dailey v. Vogl, the
contract to repair was really a part of the new letting to the wife. The
learned judge also seems to have overlooked the fact-which however was
unimportant-that in Glenn v. Hill the undertaking was gratuitous, not
contractual. His position that where the landlord rents only part of the
premises the retaining of control of the other part is immaterial, seems also
unsound. Where the landlord retains control of part of the premises he
is under the ordinary duty of any land occupier toward business visitors.
Ante, p. 24, note 19. Trimble, J., while refraining from committing
himself as to the correctness of the decision in Graff v. Lemp Brewing Co.,
apparently took the position that while a contract to keep in repair would
have given the tenant a right of action on the contract in Dailey v. Vogl,
yet since there was only a contract to repair there was no liability either in
tort or contract. It is regrettable that the learned Judge did not assert
emphatically that there was no liability in tort where the contract was to
keep in repair.
129. (1894) 126 Mo. 372, 392.
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plaintiff in danger, the defendant must not cease the undertaking without first using ordinary care to notify the plaintiff
of such discontinuance. In Burns v. North Chicago Rolling
Mill Co., 130 a railroad company had for two years kept a flagman
at a crossing tho it was under no duty to do so; it then withdrew
him without notice to the public. The plaintiff relying upon
the presence of the flagman, failed to look out for a coming
train and was injured. The court held that the withdrawal of
the flagman under such circumstances was negligence. 3 '
SUMMARY

The standard. of care required of adults is that care which
a person of average prudence would have used under similar
circumstances. Whether a child is bound to use such care as
children of his age of average prudence would use or whether
the knowledge, capacity and experience of the particular child
is to be taken into consideration is not clear. Tho in the law
of bailments there are legal degrees of care, there are none in
the law of torts. Nor are there legal degrees of negligence,
i. e., tho there are degrees of negligence in fact, they have no
legal significance apart from statute.
At least where the plaintiff relies upon a positive duty of
the defendant, such as the duty of a land occupier to repair, he
130. (1886) 65 Wis. 312, 27 N. W. 43.
131. In Trout v. Watkins Livery and Undertaking Co. (1910) 148
Mo. App. 621, the plaintiff who was ill at a hospital employed the defendant a livery stable keeper to carry her to her home; the defendant was
not informed that the plaintiff was ill but the defendant's driver saw that
she was; the driver carried her to within six blocks of her'home and then

refused to complete the journey because of the condition of the streets,
offering to take her back to the hospital or to carry her to a livery barn

where she could get another closed conveyance. The plaintiff felt that
she was not strong enough to accept either alternative and therefore sent
a message to a friend who came and took her home in an open carriage.
On account of the exposure and delay the plaintiff suffered a severe illness.
The court seemed to hold there was a duty independent of the contract to
look out for the safety of the plaintiff after knowledge of her illness and

that the failure of the defendant to complete the trip was under the circumstances, a breach of that duty. The decision is supportable on the ground
that altho notice was given to the plaintiff of the discontinuance of the
undertaking, her physical condition was such that she was unable at the
time of notice adequately to protect herself against the increased danger
which the discontinuance had brought about.
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must show that there was a duty owed to himself; it is not sufficient that there was a breach of duty towards some one else.
The law in regard to intentional torts apparently is that a
breach of duty towards another is sufficient.
Whether in cases
of active unintentional conduct the duty must always be owed
to the plaintiff is not clear from the cases; in those jurisdictions which apply the natural and probable consequence rule of
legal cause, the question is largely academic.
Where the defendant is engaged in active conduct the probability of damage to others is a sufficient basis upon which to
raise a duty to use care. Where there is no active conduct of
the defendant relied upon, the plaintiff must also show that the
defendant occupied such a relation towards the plaintiff that
the law imposes a duty to use positive precautions; as gathered
from the decisions, such a duty arises only where the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff is or may be a benfit to the defendant. Toward infant trespassers there is an
anomalous duty upon land occupiers in regard to dangerous
things brought on the land, which are likely to attract children.
Since probability is a sufficient basis in cases of active conduct,
a land occupier engaged in changing the condition of premises
owes a duty to look out for trespassers at places where they
are likely to be. Where the land occupier gives express permission to enter upon his land, there is probably a duty to warn
of hidden dangers of which he knows; such a duty seems to be
analagous to the duty imposed by the law of deceit-it would be
in the nature of a fraud by concealment to give permission without a warning.
Toward the traveling public a city or town owes a duty
to use ordinary care to keep the streets in repair; the duty seems
to be based upon the giving of large powers to these corporations
for such purposes.
While a vendor of land apparently escapes liability in
regard to the condition of the land from the time the vendee
takes possession of the premises, a lessor remains liable for
damage resulting from acts of the lessee which he either actually
foresaw or could have foreseen by the exercise of ordinary care.
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The duty of a bailor of a chattel is similar to that of a land
occupier. Where he knows of a defect in a chattel making it
dangerous, he owes a duty to warn those who are likely to use
the chattel; where he does not know of any defect there is a
duty to find out and warn only where he is benefitted by the
bailment. In the absence of knowledge of defects, the duty of
a manufacturer or vendor of chattels toward those who may
reasonably be expected to use the chattels, is arbitrarily limited to such chattels as are in their natural condition dangerous
to life.
Where the danger of harm is very great the common law
sometimes imposes a liability in the absence of negligence, as,
for example, in the keeping of dangerous explosives and dangerous animals. There was also liability at peril by the English common law for damage done to land by straying animals; this rule has never been entirely adopted in Missouri.
Whether there is in Missouri any liability at peril for water
brought onto one's land seems at least doubtful. While the
duty in regard to fire is merely to use ordinary care, one who
has injured another by the discharge of a firearm has the burden
of proving that it was utterly without his fault.
The duty to use care may be affected by statute or ordinance either by requiring specific things to be done under certain circumstances or by making one liable irrespective of negligence.
Where one gratuitously undertakes to do something which
he is under no legal obligation to do, he must use ordinary care
in performing it so as not to cause damage to others; and he
must not cease performing after he has begum, without a warning to others who have been rightfully relying upon the undertaking and who may be imperiled by the discontinuance, so
that they may protect themselves. Where, however, he has
not begun the undertaking there is no tort duty even tho the
undertaking is contractual.
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